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Article 6

CAN YOU CARE FOR PEOPLE AND STILL
COUNT THE COSTS?
DAN B. DOBBS*

Marc Galanter, whom I do not know but wish I did, compels
you to take him seriously. I react to almost every paragraph he
writes; and for this reason, the editors of the Maryland Law Review
were wise to request the briefest of comments. The limit of the
comment, however, should not be taken to reflect a limit either of
interest in his work or of the seriousness with which I take it.
I.
First, let me say I agree that litigation can produce wonderful
results of the kind Professor Galanter describes and illustrates in his
last pages. If his article had been addressed to members of the public, or to interest groups that consistently attack lawyers and litigation-doctors' groups, for example-I would have been more
comfortable with its enthusiasm for the benefits of litigation. The
article seems intended to redress what Galanter perceives to be an
overemphasis on the costs of litigation. But we lawyers have on the
whole always thought rather well of our profession and its
processes. Whatever may be Professor Galanter's inner premises,
his conclusions represent what, after all, we really want to hear: that
our life's work is a noble thing. We lawyers already believe that litigation has important benefits; perhaps we need to be reminded that
litigation has important costs as well.
In truth there are costs to litigation that parallel its benefitsboth tangible and intangible costs. No one knows how much litigation's tangible, financial costs really are. The figures range from
weak to almost nonexistent.' National standards of accounting for
public litigation costs do not exist. 2 Even when states do furnish
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1. There is a good study necessarily extrapolating from limited data. SeeJ. KARALIK
& R. Ross, COSTS OF THE CtVILJUSTICE SYSTEM (1983) [hereinafter KAKALIK & Ross] and
the helpful summary and review, Brunet, Measuring the Costs of Civil Justice, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 916 (1985).
2. The authors of KAKALIK & Ross had to be content with data from only three
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some limited kinds of reporting on costs of court systems, these reports may or may not take into account expensive items such as amortized costs of building a courthouse, or maintaining it. Ways of
figuring costs of retirement systems for judicial personnel, or court
libraries, may differ. Public accounting ignores some costs altogether. Certainly some "overhead" costs of the legal system, such
as the public costs of law schools, are not considered. The result is
that we have inadequate information about costs, but we can be sure
the totals are substantial.'
Costs paid by litigants-and then often passed on to consumers, many of whom never litigate about anything at all-are even
higher. Although no one really knows, Cutler's estimate 4 that the
legal profession, in money terms, is bigger than the electric power
business could be correct. To say so does not suggest that the costs
are not worth it; that is another inquiry, and one that would have to
be accompanied by some assessment of alternatives to those costs.
But it is certainly not true that litigation-or the legal system as a
whole-is without substantial direct financial costs.
And just as there may be less tangible benefits of litigation,
there may also be less tangible costs of litigation. Such costs could
be investigated more or less empirically, although I remain unconvinced that every part of the floating world must be subjected to
social science studies as it passes by. In any event I doubt that there
is any more reason to deny that there are intangible costs than to
deny that there are intangible benefits of litigation.
What could count as costs in the intangible sense? Just as litigation might induce potential defendants to provide a more appropriate level of safety (the Madison Parks example), litigation may also
encourage defendants to provide more safety efforts than would be
desirable, thus increasing private costs and sometimes even increasstates and a federal district court because discrepancies in the way figures were reported
made it difficult or impossible to compare others. Id. at viii.
3. Public costs in trial courts of superior jurisdiction were estimated in KAKALK &
Ross at over $2 billion for fiscal year 1980. Id. at xix, Table S.9. This excludes many
trial courts such as municipal courts. Given some of the problems of making the estimate, the figure may be rather conservative. In addition, there are items not listed that
perhaps should be considered, in part, as costs of litigation. Prison libraries, for example, might fall in this category. Two billion dollars is of course a relatively small sum
compared to, say, the defense budget; but as the saying goes, a billion here, a billion
there-after a while it adds up.
4. Cutler, Conflicts of Interest, 30 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1016 (1981) (estimating lawyer's
charges at $30 billion annually). Crampton, The Trouble with Lawyers (andLaw Schools), 35
J. LEGAL EDUC. 359, 360 (1985) suggested that the figure is closer to $40 or $50 billion
annually. Neither estimate purports to be based on a rigorous empirical investigation.
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ing actual hazards. The doctor practicing defensive medicine, for
example, may order additional operations in an effort to provide
more safety; but this may increase the risk that the patient will succumb to a properly administered but wholly unnecessary anesthetic.
Similarly, the university administrator, fearing suit by a teacher
if tenure is ultimately denied, may actively avoid any good comments in the teacher's file. The administrator may adopt a stance
my colleague Kenney Hegland calls "instant adversarialness"-effectively denying the young teacher the support needed to develop
into a good teacher and scholar.
Or the publisher, under constant threat of suits for libel or invasion of privacy, may censor itself rather than run the risk of the very
high judgments sometimes secured in defamation cases-or the
legal costs of defending.5 If the potential for litigation induces the
young gentlemen of a Princeton eating club to take their meals in
the presence of women, a practice I feel sure will not prove harmful
to their personal development, then the potential for litigation may
equally induce newspapers to become their own censors, a practice
that is most distinctly harmful to a free society.
There are many kinds of costs that can flow from litigation.
Some kinds of claims offer potential recoveries so great that many
people may be induced to assert them, even though the win-rate is
very low. But if one out of every ten plaintiffs is able to win such a
claim, that means nine out of ten defendants must pay attorney fees
and other expenses of suit even though they are entirely innocent.
The innocent nine are hostages for the liability of the tenth. The
costs to them in money and in life disruption may far exceed the
gains to the one plaintiff. I count this a very high cost indeed. It will
be difficult to estimate such a cost, perhaps impossible to estimate it
by social science methodology. But whether injustice to the innocent hostages is sufficient in any given class of case to outweigh the
benefits of litigation, that injustice is a real cost that ought to be
6
assessed, along with other CoStS.
5. Avoidance of self-censorship in defamation cases was the aim of New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Although the rule in Times-Sullivan has been substantially undermined by the vacillations of a divided Court as well as by decisions of lower
courts, the ideal that censorship is to be avoided has not itself been questioned.
Whatever the shimmering rules of the moment, then, self-censorship must be counted
as a cost.
6. This is no place for development of the idea sketched out freehand in this paragraph, but I should notice one strong counterargument. All of us have the right to sue
and, somewhat reciprocally, the liability to being sued. A defendant, who may use the
court system as a plaintiff or counterclaimant, has no reasonable claim that she is being
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There are other intangible costs; readers who practice law will
think of some of them. I do not believe we should ignore the costs
in litigation any more than we should ignore the benefits. Professor
Galanter does not counsel us to ignore the costs, but I think his
focus is so strongly upon the benefits of litigation as a potential
weapon for those without power that he does not give adequate attention to the costs-which surely must ultimately be considered if
the legal system is to improve. Improvement is a goal I think we
might entertain even if we do not think that over-litigation is a "portent of doom."
II.

Second, as to the thesis I take to be central in Professor Galanter's present article: litigation has not increased substantially,
but if it has increased, there are very good reasons for it-much of
what I have said in comment on the last portion of the article is
relevant here as well.
Perhaps here we should arm ourselves against statistics and
against Professor Galanter's candor in admitting that figures are untrustworthy. I say we should arm ourselves, because while he discounts some of the figures, he does not seem to discount them
equally.' But I think we should discount them all for a variety of
reasons, not the least of which is that the number of cases filed in
court is probably a rather poor index of the real amount of litigation.' Many claims are pursued successfully without filing at all, betreated unjustly merely because she is sued. But as the plaintiff's claims become less
and less justified-as we approach the one-in-ten ratio of success-reciprocity ceases to
justify the costs imposed upon the innocent defendant, as the law of malicious prosecution would imply. You might not find injustice until reciprocity has significantly diminished, but you would surely have to say there are "costs" long before that-at least in
any case in which the costs imposed upon innocent defendants exceed the gains to the
winning plaintiff.
7. The different ways in which figures are used may be characteristic of social science writing. In this case, Galanter, I think rightly, tells us that "figures like litigation
" Galanter, The Day After the Litigarates are theories, [and] especially slippery ones .
tion Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 15 (1986). He makes the point to warn us that the great
percentage increases reflected in his Table 2 should not be taken at face value. But
elsewhere he not only develops a mass of figures, he appears to build parts of his platform from them. Thus he concludes that "some kinds of cases are increasing while
others are decreasing" (id. at 8)-a conclusion he reaches in spite of slippery figures and
in spite of the added concession that the number of cases filed does not provide a "satisfying measure of litigiousness." Id. at 7. It appears to me that Galanter found a differential in slipperiness of the figures. My view is that none of the figures should be taken
as dispositive.
8. Elsewhere Galanter suggests that we "visualize litigation as the arrival at courts
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cause litigation itself is a threat and sometimes a very one-sided
threat. Perhaps more important, the amount of litigation activity in
claims actually filed undoubtedly has increased in the past generation as lawyers have engaged in very substantial discovery and motion practice. Even if the figures submitted about caseload and case
filings should be taken as accurate, then, they should not be taken as
realistic estimates of judicial activity.
More than this, Professor Galanter's conclusion that "[h]igher
caseloads do not represent a heightened appetite for adversarial
combat," is not one that rests on figures at all, in spite of the fact
that figures dominate most of the discussion in the first portions of
the paper. We should not, in other words, take it that the conclusion has been proven by facts or figures merely because figures appear in great quantity.
But more important to me than any of this is the question about
why there is a question. In the end Professor Galanter seems to
grant that the caseload is "heightened" but seems to insist that it is
only "heightened," not overwhelming. The real meat of his conclusion, however, is his speculation about why people perceive a litigation explosion. He believes that people find a litigation explosion
because they do not like what they see in the results-more regulation, more liability for the "haves," and more "rights" for the
"have-nots." I think his speculations are at least partly correct, but
their correctness and importance are wholly unrelated to whether
there is in fact a litigation explosion.
In fact, though it would be interesting to know whether litigation is increasing in some sense, I think that may be far less significant, even for Professor Galanter's own conclusion, than some other
issues related to it. Even if litigation filings had not increased at all,
litigation costs are certainly up. If, as Galanter asserts at one point,
most claims are settled without "full blown" litigation, today's motion practice consumes time and money in excess of many "full
blown" trials a generation ago. Even unbiased observers might

of disputes ...." Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don 't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.

REv. 4, 11-12 (1983). If litigation is merely the arrival of a dispute in court, the number
of cases filed is the only index to litigation. But while this definition provides something
more or less measurable by social science methods, it does not permit even an estimate
of what is going on after the arrival of a complaint in the clerk's office. And it would
exclude what lawyers think of as litigation-those "cases" that are being seriously investigated, researched, and negotiated, but that have not been "filed" in court. I do not
read Galanter's present article as attempting to define litigation so narrowly.
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think that this is a meaningful increase in litigation, no matter how
many actual complaints are filed.
But even if the number of cases filed had not increased one iota,
even if costs had not increased, litigation might still be too expensive either in tangible costs or intangible costs or both. Even if costs
and filings had remained constant, litigation might have been too
expensive all along; or it might have become too expensive in the
light of other social needs or in the light of alternative solutions to
litigation. What are the real costs of litigation? Are they too much
in the light of benefits and alternatives? Those are, I think, more
important questions than increase in litigation as such.
We need to be willing to improve the system for which we as
lawyers and judges are, more than any other group, responsible. It
is worthy to recognize its values, but it is also worthy to recognize
that improvements might be made-not merely for the benefit of
the "haves," but for the benefit of everyone. If I read him rightly,
Professor Galanter sees the legal system as an equalizer or potential
equalizer in which those without power have at least a chance atjustice. 9 In my view this is true and worthy. But to perceive this important liberal value of the legal system does not require us to back into
the view that is the most conservative view of all-that everything
that is, is right. The legal system is not perfect. There are costs to
our system and we ought to identify them. We may differ about
when costs are "too high," but we cannot even begin the task of
improving litigation without focusing on costs as well as on benefits
of litigation.

9. "Law is a way to control and hold accountable remote and overwhelming actors." Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 14 (1986).

